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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-President's Power to Remove Director of
Tennessee Valley Authority-The Tennessee Valley Authority Act,'
though nowhere dealing directly with the President's general power of
removal, in two of its sections, (i) provides for the removal of directors
by concurrent resolutions of Congress 2 and (2) requires the President to
rimove any director who appoints or promotes employees on the basis of
political qualifications." The President, in removing the complainant
director, who was appointed with the consent of the Senate, acted on causes
other than those specifically stated in the Act.4 Held, that the Act does
not limit the President's power to remove executive officers appointed by
him for other causes than those stated, regardless of whether such officers
are predominantly engaged in quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions.5
Morgan v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 28 F. Supp. 732 (E. D. Tenn.
1939).
Although the Constitution does not specifically empower the President
to remove officers of the United States, it was long held that the power of
removal is incident to the power of appointment6 and, in the absence of
clear and explicit restrictive legislation, could be exercised without the consent of the Senate.' In Myers v. United States," this executive power
received its broadest interpretation. The court there held that Congress
had no Constitutional power to limit the President's removal of officers
whose appointment, with the consent of the Senate, was vested in him
either by the Constitution or by statute.9 However, the scope of this
sweeping decision has been limited, and one of its clear dicta overruled, 10
49

I. 48 STAT. 58 (1933), 16 U. S. C. A. § 831 et seq. (Supp. 1938), as amended by
1075 (935), 16 U. S. C. A. § 831 et seq. (Supp. 1938).
2. 48 STAT.6i (933), 16 U. S. C. A. § 831c (f) (Supp. 1938).
3. 48 STAT.63 (1933), 16 U. S. C. A. §83Ie (Supp. 1938).

STAT.

4. Instant case at 733.
5.The court also passed on the question of its jurisdiction, ruling that it was
bound by the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in Tennessee Valley Authority
v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 90 F. (2d) 885 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937), which granted
jurisdiction to the federal courts, the cases not being distinguishable in principle on the
question of jurisdiction.
6. For a summary of all the previous decisions on point see Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52, 117, I6I, 164 (1926) ; Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295
U. S. 6o2, 6og (1935). The President derives his power of appointment from the U. S.
CoNsT. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, which provides that the President "shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other publicMinisters and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the
United States . . . which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."
7. Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S.311 (9o3) ; Myers v. United States, 272

U. S. 52 (1926) ; accord, Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230 (U. S. 1839) ; Parsons v.
United States, 167 U. S. 324 (1896) ; see 3 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) §§ 995, 996.
8. 272 U. S. 52 (1926).

9.A strong dissent was filed by Justices Holmes, McReynolds, and Brandeis.
They argued, in part, that Congress did have some power to restrict removals of inferior officers, as under the CoSTrUrION, Art. II, § 2, cited supra note 6, allowing the
appointment, and hence the removal, of inferior officers to be vested in the "Heads of
Departments."
io. See Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 135 (1926), where the court indi-

cates that even executive officers with quasi-judicial duties might be removed by the
President.
(357)
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by the recent decision in Humphrey's Executor v. United States.1 Here
the power to remove a Federal Trade Commissioner was held to be restricted, by implication, to causes specifically stated in the providing act. 12
The doctrine of the Myers case was limited to "executive" officers, the court
distinguishing the cases on the "quasi-judicial" and "quasi-legislative"
character of the office, and the apparent desire of Congress to free it from
the executive branch of governmental politics. This admission of a Congressional power to limit where the office was of the proper character, as
that court saw,'3 opened a new field of speculation in relation to other
administrative agencies,' 4 including the TVA. 5 In every such case a
determination of the intent of Congress 16 and, if an intent to limit is found,
of the validity of the limitation is necessary."7 While, in the instant case,
the provision for removal by concurrent resolutions of Congress might be
construed to limit the President's power to causes stated, the multiplicity of
administrative duties placed on him by the Act ' 8 does not reveal an intent
to free the body from executive influence. Since the presence of such a
desire was the basis for the Humphrey's decision, 19 the result in the instant
case seems proper, and hence, a determination of the "executive" or "quasilegislative" or "quasi-judicial" status of the office was unnecessary. 0 Furthermore, the Act under consideration here was passed before the
decision in the Humphrey's case, and it would seem that had Congress intended any limitation it would have stated it in clear and explicit language.
Although the present result was anticipated, 2' the pliability of determinations which concern legislative intent or the character of administrative
offices seemingly will make the results of exact cases depend on expediency
as much as logic.
II. 295 U. S. 602 (1935).
12. The provisions for removal in this case were identical with those in the case of
Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S. 311 (19o3), where the court held that the power

of removal was not limited.

13. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 6o2, at 632 (1935).

14. See Donovan and Irvine, The President'sPower to Remove Members of Adininistrative Agencies (1936) 21 CORN. L. Q. 215, where many of the more important

tribunals are considered.

15. Instant case at 736.
16. The opinion in the Humphrey's case shows that the intent is to be derived
from the purpose of the whole statute, and not merely those provisions which state
causes for removal. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 6o2, 625 (1935).
17. This, of course, would depend on the nature of the office to a great extent If
the office were "purely executive" no restriction would be valid, but if it were one with
enough "quasi-judicial" or "quasi-legislative" functions, the restrictions might come
within the Humphrey's case.
18. Some of the more important duties are these: (i) to appoint members of the
board, designate the Chairman, and affix the original tenures of office, 48 STAT. 59
(1933), 16 U. S. C. A. § 83Ia (Supp. 1938) ; (2) to approve disposals of real property
deemed unnecessary for the execution of the Act, 49 STAT. 1066 (935), 16 U. S. C. A.
§ 83IC (Supp. 1938) ; (3) to transfer such governmental property to the TVA as he
deems necessary to enable it to execute its purposes, 48 STAT. 63 (I933), 16 U. S. C. A.
§ 831f (Supp. 1938). For a complete list of the duties see Note (1938) 51 HARV. L.
REv. 1249, n. 21.
19. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 625, 626 (935).
2o. Morgan was conceded, for the purpose of decision in the instant case, to be an

executive officer with quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative functions. Instant case at 736.
However, establishing that factor, in relation to the officers of our ever-increasing administrative agencies, may be the turning point of future cases which fall within the
same category as the instant case.
21. An excellent analysis which predicted the present result will be found in Note
(1938) 51 HARV. L. REV. 1246.
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Evidence-Scope of Search and Seizure Without Warrant Incidental to a Lawful Arrest-The premises on which the defendants
were lawfully arrested 1 were subjected to search without warrant and
some articles which were employed in the commission of the crime, and
others which were merely evidence thereof were seized. Defendants moved
to exclude the introduction of all these articles into evidence, because they
had been procured by an unreasonable search and seizure. Held, motion
overruled only as to those objects "used to commit the crime", for their
seizure was reasonable. United States v. Brengle, 29 F. Supp. 19o (W. D.
Va. 1939).
Even without warrant, the sanctity attached to the home and person
may be transgressed either by search or by search and seizure incidental
to lawful arrest.2 However, to avoid contravening the Fourth Amendment ' to the Federal Constitution, such search and seizure must be reasonable.4 Inasmuch as the federal rule excludes illegally secured articles from
admission into evidence,5 the problem raised by the instant case often becomes significant in criminal trials. Mere exploratory searches are denied, 6
i. For having violated the WHITE SLAVE TRAFric AcT, 36 STAT. 825 (910), IS
U. S. C. A. § 397 (1927).
2. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 2o (1925) ; Marron v. United States, 275
U. S. 192 (1927). Compare Henderson v. United States, 12 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A.
4th, 1926), and Papani v. United States, 84 F. (2d) 16o (C. C. A. 9th, 1936), with
Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). CORNELIUS, THE LAW 0F SEARCH AND
SEIZURE (2d ed. 193o) § 6o. The unlawful seizure of property does not render unlawful
that property which was rightfully seized at the same time. Id. at § 114; Wentworth
v. Sawyer, 76 Me. 434 (1884). See Notes (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 3oo, (1930) 30 COL.
L. REV. io6g, (1931) 74 A. L. R. 1387.
3. U. S. CoNsT. Amend. 4. For the states having corresponding provisions in their
constitution see Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures (1921) 34 HAv. L. REV.
361, n. I, 2.
The defendant cannot object where he, himself, was not the subject of the search,
nor can he object to the seizure of another's objects in his custody or possession even
if they are incriminatory against him. See LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (937)
117.
.4. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1885) ; United States v. Kirschenblatt,
16 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) ; United States v. Lefkowitz, 52 F. (2d) 52 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1931), 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 232, aff'd, 285 U. S. 452 (1932).
This question of reasonableness of search came only infrequently before the courts
in the pre-prohibition era. See Waite, Reasonable Search and Research (1938) 86 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 623.
5. The development of the present federal rule is exceedingly interesting because
the rule actually was reversed and then reestablished with the court distinguishing, rather
than overruling, in accomplishing the change. Four cases trace this result: Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1885); Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (904);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914) ; Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298
(1921).
See BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1927)
§ 254; I WHARTON, EVDENCE IN CRIINAL CASES (th ed. 1935) § 373V; 4 WIGMoE,
EVIENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2184. It is suggested that the wire tapping case [Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U. 5. 438 (1928)], although distinguished, might mean a return to
the former rule of Ist.
admitting
illegal evidence. See Willis, Unreasonable Searches and
L. J. 311.
Seizures (929) 4
Favorable criticisms of the present federal rule are contained in Atkinson, Admnssibility of Evidenwce Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures (1925) 25
COL. L. REV. ii; Note (1932) 20 KEN. L. 3. 354. Opponents of the rule are in the
majority, see 4 W MoaR EVIDENCE §§ 2263, 2264; Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure (1925) 19 ILL. L. REv. 303; Knox, Self Incrimination (1925)
74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 139; Note (1932) 20 KEN. L. J. 358. The advantages and disadvantages of this rule are listed in outline form in Note (1926) 24 KEN. L. J. 191, 198.
6. United States v. 1013 Crates of Empty 0. S. Whiskey Bottles, 52 F. (2d) 49
(C. C. A. 2d, 1931) ; Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925) (automobile) ;

United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559 (1927) (boat). The Carrollcase has been severely
criticized because it raises anew the danger of exploratory searches being permitted.
See Black, A Critique of the Carroll Case (1929) 29 CoL. L. REV. io68.
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since the power of search without warrant is not permitted to be greater
than that conferred with warrant.' However, the scope of search has been
extended from the room 8 in which an arrest is made, to the entire premises,9 to an adjoining building, 10 and even to a place of deposit some distance away." No rule of thumb describes this privilege of search; " but
the present tendency is to liberalize and broaden its scope. A contrary
policy might reward the criminal who could remove himself an appreciable
distance from the scene of the crime."
The related power of seizure is
similarly surrounded by shifting dogma. To seize property of mere evidentiary value, even during a lawful search, is deemed per se unreasonable. 4
Only objects connected with the crime as the means of commission or
escape, or its "fruits" may be taken into custody. 15 At present, therefore,
documents containing unimpeachable proof of a defendant's guilt may be
available, and yet, their seizure and subsequent use prohibited insofar as
their contents are merely of evidentiary value.'" This distinction has been
evolved in an effort to render inviolate fundamental rights of personal liberty and security against such transgressions as occurred under the English
general warrants and the colonial writs of assistance." However, social
utility should be balanced against this individual protection. Furthermore,
the differentiation between articles which are the means of commission or
the mere evidence thereof is often nebulous.'
Therefore, the taking of all
incriminatory objects ought to be considered a reasonable seizure; hence,
if located by reasonable search, they would be lawfully secured and conse7. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932) ; United States v. Kirschenblatt, I6 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926). See Wood, The Scope of the Constitutional
Immunity Against Searches and Seizures (1927) 34 W. VA. L. Q. I, 21. Contra:
(1928) 28 COL. L. Ray. 383.
8. Wida v. United States, 52 F. (2d) 424 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931); United States v.
Thiel, 52 F. (2d) 170 (E. D. Mich. 1931); Pickett v. Marcucci's Liquors, 112 Conn.
169, 151 At. 526 (i93o) (next room). Compare People v. Cona, i8o Mich. 641, 147
N. W. 525 (1914), with People with Conway, 225 Mich. 152, 195 N. W. 679 (1923).
But see United States v. Mounday, 208 Fed. 186, 188 (D. Kan. 1913).
Visibility of these objects has sometimes been made a prerequisite to the granting
of this right. Compare Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S.344 (1931),
with Marron v. United States, 275 U. S.192 (927).
q. Marron v. United States, 275 U. S.192 (1927) ; United States v. Poller, 43 F.
(2d) 911 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) ; United States v. Charles, 8 F. (2d) 302 (N. D. Cal.
1925). See Nordelli v. United States, 24 F. (2d) 665, 667 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928).
io. State v. Estes, 151 Wash. 51, 274 Pac. 1053 (1929).
ii. United States v. Wilson, 163 Fed. 338 (C. C. A. 2d, 198o). Contra: Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S.385 (1920) ; Agnello v. United States,
269 U. S. 2o (1925).
12. See Notes (1933) 82 A. L. R. 782, (1931) 74 A. L. R. 1387, and earlier annotations.
13. See (1937) 7 BROOKLYN L. REV. 239.
14. Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921) ; see People v. Defore, 242 N. Y.
13, 19, I50 N. E. 585, 586 (1926).
1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIIITATioNs (Carrington ed. 1927) 6Io; Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal
Trade Commission (1928) 28 COL. L. REV. 708, 905; Note (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 518.
Under this rule the prosecutor cannot secure such objects at all. It is interesting
to compare the civil rule for discovery and production of documents. FED. RULES Civ.
PRoc., Rule 34. 48 STAT. 1O64 (934), 28 U. S. C. A. 723c (Supp. 1938).
15. United States v. Poller, 43 F. (2d) 911 (C. C. A. 2d, 193o) ; Pickett v. Marcucci's Liquors, 112 Conn. 169, 151 At]. 526 (1930) ; I BisHoP, NEW CaimiNAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1913) § 211.
16. See Chafee, Progressof the Law (1922) 35 HARV. L. REv. 673.
17. For an excellent and thorough discussion of this subject, see LAssoN, op. Cit.
supra note 3, 13-105. Shorter analyses may be found in Boyd v. United States, 116
U. S.616 (1885) ; i COOLEY, loc. cit. supra note 14; Fraenkel, snpra note 3, at 365, n. 28.
I8. Compare United States v. Mills, 185 Fed. 318 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911), and
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S.452 (1932), with Marron v. United States, 275
U.

S. 192 (1927).
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quently admissible in evidence. 19 Such a result would approximate that
reached by most states 2 through a rule of evidence which admits any
relevant material even if illegally secured."'

Insurance-Liability of Successive Insurers for Damages Arising During the Term of the First Policy and Continuing to Accrue
During the Second-Plaintiff steamship company stowed a cargo of
tobacco over and around a shipment of valonia, the heat and vapor of which
slowly damaged the tobacco. During the first part of the seven week
voyage the plaintiff was protected by the first insurer's policy of indemnity
against liability for damage to cargo and at the expiration thereof the similar policy of the second insurer took effect. Experts testified that 26 per
cent. of the damage was done during the term of the first policy and the
balance during the term of the second. Held (one justice dissenting), that
since the injury was continuing, the first insurer was liable for 26 per cent.
of the damage, the second insurer for the balance. Export S. S. Corp. v.
American Ins. Co., io6 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
It is well settled that liability for negligence under a contract arises
at the time of the act, and not at the time the damage occurs or is discovered.' The rule is applied to carriers.2 On that basis it would seem
that the first insurer should have borne the entire loss,8 but the court held
that the negligence was continuous and thus gave rise to a continuing
rather than immediate accrual of liability.4 In view of the fact that it is
impractical if not impossible to shift or examine cargo while at sea, 5 the
court apparently confused continuing negligence with continuing damage.
Accepting their premise, however, the result is undoubtedly correct. The
"death-wound" principle of marine insurance, applied to contracts indemnifying against loss," does not operate to make the insurer liable for loss
sustained by injury to the vessel after expiration of the policy, but rather
takes the subsequent sinking of the ship as evidence as to its worth at the
ig. While no case on its facts has so held, the broad language used in decisions
would seem to permit this. Seizure is permitted of "evidentiary articles" [Sayers v.
United States, 2 F. (2d) L46, i47 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924)]; "articles which furnish evi-

dence against the accused" [Thatcher v. Weeks, 79 Me. 547, 549, 11 Atl. 599 (1887) ;
Smith v. Jerome, 47 Misc. 22, 93 N. Y. Supp. 202 (Sup. Ct. io5)]; articles "reasonably evidentiary" [Getchell v. Page, 103 Me. 387, 392, 69 Ati. 624, 626 (igo8)], and
even "anything useful as evidence on trial" [State v. Hum Quock, 89 Mont. 503, 505,
3oo Pa. 220, 221 (931)].
See Wood, supra note 7, at 24.
2o. See Note (1934) 88 A. L. R. 348, and earlier annotations.
21. People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, i5o N. E. 585 (1926).

See note 5 supra.

i. Russell & Co. v. Polk County Abstract Co., 87 Ia. 233, 54 N. W. 212 (0893)
(discussing the rule at great length) ; I WooD, LmrATIONS (4 th ed. 1916) 641.
2. Pennsylvania Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 144 Ill. 197, 33 N. E. 415
(1893) ; see Corporation of the Royal Exch. Assurance v. United States, 75 F. (2d)
473, 480 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). ANGELL, LIMITATIONS (6th ed. 1876) § 136.
3. Southern Ry. News Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y., 26 Ky. L. 1217, 83
S. W. 620 (1904).

4. "From that time (of the first damage) a cause of action against the libellant
accrued in favor of the cargo owners. It is important to observe, however, that the
infliction of the damage was not a single event. . . . The situation was the same as
if the ship had sprung a leak with the ship owner at fault, and sea water had poured in
on the tobacco day after day." Instant case at p. ii.
5. Instant case at p. 13.
6. See cases cited infra note 7. Where a ship receives its "death-wound" during
the term of a policy of indemnity against loss, and sinks after expiration of the policy,
the insurer is liable for the full value of the ship.
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time the policy expired.' The similar rule of fire insurance cases allowing
recovery for goods destroyed after the term, provided they were touched
by fire before expiration, would seem to be based upon the same principle.'
Their actual subsequent destruction coupled with the fact that they were
surrounded by fire when the policy expired, indicates that at the expiration of the policy they were valueless.' The slow progress of the damage
in the instant case seems to destroy the analogy, though the fact that once
the goods were stowed away they were not likely to be disturbed, may tend
to support it. However, it would seem to make little difference which way
that rule is applied to the instant situation 10 provided its application is
7. Stagg and Snell v. United Ins. Co., 3 Johns. Cas. 43 (N. Y. 18o2) ; Duncan v.

Great Western Ins. Co., I Abb. App. Dec. 562 (N. Y. x867) ; Howell v. Cincinnati Ins.
Co., 7 Ohio 277, pt. I (1835); Howell v. Protection Ins. Co., 7 Ohio 284 (1835);
Peters v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 3 S. & R. 25 (Pa. 1817). Note the special contract in the
last case cited, which is commented upon in the Knight case cited below.
For a thorough discussion of the English law and cases on this problem, clearly
substantiating the view that there can be no recovery for loss sustained after the expiration of the policy under the "death-wound" rule: Knight v. Faith, 15 Q. B. 649, 117
Eng. Rep. R. 6o5 (185o).

Where the insured seeks to apply the "death-wound" rule to slightly different situations in order to recover for a loss which was sustained after expiration, the attempt
invariably fails. Coit v. Smith, 3 Johns. Cas. 16 (N. Y. 1802) (a leading case) ; Lockyer v. Offley, I T. R. 252, 99 Eng. Rep. R. 1079 (K. B. 1786) ; Hare v. Travis, 7 B. &
C. 14, lo8 Eng. Rep. R. 63o (K. B 1827); Hough and Co. v. Head, 5 Asp. Cas. 505
(Q. B. 1885).
However, certain comments have been taken as giving some support to the opposite
view, viz., that there can be recovery for loss sustained after expiration. I ARNOLD,
MARINE INSURANCE (I ith ed. 1924) §§ 437, 438; 5 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE
LAW (1929) § 1213; 4 JOYCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1918) §§ 2792, 2793; 2 PARSONS,
MARINE INSURANCE (1868) 65, 66, would distinguish between time and voyage policies.
But a careful examination of these authorities and the cases they cite will hardly admit
of such a conclusion.
8. See cases and comment in note 9 infra.
9. Cases involving such recovery are: Wiig v. Girard Fire and Marine Insurance
Co. of Phila., oo Neb. 271, 159 N. W. 416 (ii6) ; Globe and Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. of
N. Y. v. David Moffat Co., 154 Fed. 13 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.

Doll, 23 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928).
In Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Peaslee Gaulbert Co., 12o Ky. 752, 87 S. W.
1115 (9o5) it was held that the insurer was not liable for goods destroyed by fire
which had not touched the insured property prior to the expiration of the policy, even
though its subsequent destruction appeared to be inevitable at the moment the policy
ended. To hold otherwise, said the court, would be to extend the term of the policy
beyond the point for which the insurer had received consideration. See the comment
on this case in (19o6) i HARV. L. REV. 217, and the limitation it points out.
That the real basis for these holdings is the "worthlessness" of the goods at the
moment the policy expires, though they are not consumed until later, is suggested by
the Rochester Gernan case just cited and in 5 CoucH, 0c. Cit. supra note 7. To the
contrary, however, is a frequently quoted dictum in Davis v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co.,
158 Cal. 766, 772, 112 Pac. 549, 552 (1910) to the effect that the reason for the result
in these cases is the difficulty of estimating just how much damage was sustained prior
to expiration. But it may be doubted whether this is the correct explanation of these
cases since that is to say in effect that because it is difficult to determine what fraction
of the loss the insurer should bear he ought therefore to bear the whole.
IO. Cf. Howell v. Protection Ins. Co., 7 Ohio 284, 287 (1835). Nor are workmen's
compensation cases analogous, for there the insurer's contract is to indemnify the employer for liability to an employee injured by an accident which occurs during the term
of the policy. There the contract stipulates that it is the accident that is to occur during the term rather than the damage or the liability, whereas in the instant case the contract was interpreted by all three opinions to mean that it was the liability that was to
occur during the term. (The opinion of the lower court appears in 26 F. Supp. 79.)
Phillips v. Holmes Express Co., 19o App. Div. 336, 179 N. Y. Supp. 400 (3d Dep't
IgIg), (1920) 20 COL. L. REV. 495, is a good example of such compensation cases where

there were successive policies as in the instant case. For an example of the operation of
such contracts as are used in automobile insurance, see citation in note 3 supra, where
the contract, though held by a corporation, was of that type.
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settled. The real problem suggested by this case, and yet to be decided,,"
is, given a case where liability in full attaches to the insured at the time
of the first damage, do the terms of such a policy as this 12 mean only that
the insurer will not indemnify for a new and distinct liability arising after
term, or further, that neither will it indemnify for damages accruing after
term to a prior liability? In a situation similar to the instant case, while
the second insurer would bear none of the loss since no liability arose during the term of its policy, the courts would probably have little difficulty
in allowing the insured to recover in full from the first insurer by means
of the former interpretation, in view of the rule that insurance contracts
are to be construed most strictly in favor of the insured.'3

Labor Law-Secondary Boycott Enjoined as Unlawful Interference with Property Right to Conduct Business-Plaintiff, a corporation owned and operated by trade union, seeks a permanent injunction
restraining rival union from interfering with plaintiff's marketing by primary and secondary boycotts. Defendants attempted to force plaintiff to
comply with the ruling of parent union that defendants had jurisdiction
over certain of plaintiff's employees.' Held (one justice dissenting), injunction granted. A corporation, though owned by a union, occupies the
same position at law as any other corporation and is entitled to relief from
interference with its trade. United Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 93 P.
(2d) 772 (Wash. 1939).

The boycott has developed in labor disputes as one of the most effective
devices by which labor is enabled to gain its demands. In legal consequence, distinction has been made between the primary and secondary
boycott. The primary boycott 2 being a combination to directly refrain
from dealings with the employer and chiefly a peaceful means of persuasion,
ii. But perhaps the case cited in note 3 supra would be controlling.
12.

79

The applicable provisions appear in the opinion of the lower court, 26 F. Supp.

(S. D. N. Y. 1938).

13. Vancouver Lumber Co., Ltd. v. Home Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 414 (S. D. N. Y.
1933), aff'd, 68 F. (2d) ioig (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
The rules of "divided damages" are not applicable here, being reserved for situations in which there are two causes of damage. Insurance Co. v. Transportation Co.,
12 Wall. I94 (U. S. i87o) semble. "Contribution" only applies, of course, where the
two policies are concurrent.
It is interesting to note that had there been only one policy, the court below would
have held the insurer in full, whether it happened to be either the first or the second
of these two defendants. The majority opinion would have held the single insurer for
only so much damage as occured during the term of his policy, and the dissent would
have held the first insurer in this case in full, had he been the only insurer, but would
have refused to hold the second insurer here at all, had his been the only policy.
i. A very recent federal case, after comprehensively discussing the background of
the controversy involved in the instant case, has since denied the power of the parent
union to make such a decision. Obergfell v. Green, 29 F. Supp. 589 (D. D. C. 1939).
An injunction was granted therein restraining the American Federation of Labor from
thus transferring the beer drivers from the Brewers Union to the Teamsters Union
(defendants in the instant case). The court states that though the courts generally
will not interfere with decisions in internal union affairs, since the property rights of
the employee-drivers in sick, death, and strike benefits are being detrimentally affected,
the court must grant its equitable relief.
2. For definitions of a primary boycott, see Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, i56 Cal.
70, 75-76, 303 Pac. 324, 327-328 (igog) ; Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor, 37 Mont. 264, 272-273, 96 Pac. 127, 129-130 (i9o8) ; Mills v. United States Printing Co., 99 App. Div. 6o5, 6op-6io, 9I N. Y. Supp. i85, 388-,89 (1904).
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has generally been held legal. 3 The secondary boycott, however, involves
a combination to exercise definite coercive pressure upon the employer's
customers, to cause them to withhold or withdraw their patronage under
fear of similar activity directed against themselves. 4 Third party rights
being jeopardized thereby, and the employer's property rights , in a free
market being interfered with, the state courts almost universally 8 have
held the secondary boycott unlawful. Such decisions have been consistently affirmed under federal anti-trust statutes.7 The recent Norris-La
Guardia Act s and the state anti-injunction statutes 9 patterned thereafter,
although sanctioning many devices of labor for collective bargaining, have
been interpreted as not affecting the illegality of the secondary boycott.1"
3. United Chain Theatres v. Phila. Moving Picture Operators Union, 5o F. (2d)

189 (E. D. Pa. 1913) (primary boycott held legal while a secondary one was considered illegal) ; Paramount Enterprises v. Mitchell, 104 Fla. 407, 140 So. 328 (1932) ;
Robison v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local, 35 Idaho 418, 207 Pac. 132 (1922) ;
Stillwell Theatre v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932) ; McCormick v. Local
Union, 13 Ohio C. C. (N. s.) 545 (1911); cf. Harvey v. Chapman, 226 Mass. 191, 115
N. E. 304 (1917); Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77

N. W. 13 (1898).

4. For definitions of a secondary boycott, see FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE
LABOR INJUNcTION (i930) 43 ("a combination to influence A by exerting some sort of

economic or social pressure against persons who deal with A") ; Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U. S. 312, 330 (i92i); Meier v. Speer, 96 Ark. 68, 624-625, 132 S. W. 988, 991
(91o);
Lietzman v. Radio Broadcasting Station WCFL, 282 Ill. App. 203, 214
(1935); Ellis v. Journeymen Barbers' International Union, 194 Iowa 1179, 1182, 191
N. W. 111, 113 (1922); Smythe Neon Sign Co. v. Local Union, 284 N. W. 126, 130
(Iowa i939) ; Gray v. Building Trades Council, 9i Minn. 171, 179, 97 N. W. 663, 666
(1903).
5. Equity requires some actual or threatened interference with a property right of
the complainant, before it will grant its remedies in a labor dispute. Warm, A Study
of the Judicial Attitude Toward Trade Unions and Labor Legislatim (1939) 23 MINN.
L. REV. 255, 302, n. log, citing the many cases upholding this principle. The Supreme
Court in the famous case of Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 327 (1921) bluntly
states the employer's rights in the boycott cases as "Plaintiff's business is a property
right", citing Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 465 (1920). Cf.
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917). The Washington Supreme Court has long recognized the right of freedom of business, as shown by Jensen
v. Cooks' & Waiters' Union, 39 Wash. 531, 537, 81 Pac. io6g, 1070 (I9O5), "To destroy
his business . . . is just as reprehensible as it is to physically destroy his property.
Either is a violation of a natural right, the right to own, and peacefully enjoy, property."
6. The secondary boycott has been definitely sustained in exceptionally few jurisdictions, California and Montana being noteworthy for their stand. Parkinson Co. v.
Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027 (19o8) ; Pierce v. Stablemen's
Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (igog) ; Empire Theatre Co. v. Cloke, 53 Mont. 183,
163 Pac. 107 (1917).

7. The Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. § I (1929), especially
as amended by the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730-738 (914), 29 U. S. C. A. § 52 (1927),
has been principally applied in these cases. The most important cases thereon being,
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917) ; Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921) ; Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone
Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37 (1927) ; Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 4o F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A.
2d, 1930). But see, the dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J., in the Duple case mpra at
486. For a critical discussion see FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION

(1930) c. 4.
8. 47 STAT. 70 (932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ O1-115 (934), which was held constitutional in Lauf v. E. S. Skinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323 (1938).
q. At least 23 states have adopted anti-injunction statutes, including WASH. Rzv.
STAT. (Remington, 1931) tit. 50, c. 2, § 7612. For a collection and classification of

these statutes, see Riddlesbarger, State Anti-Injunction Legislation (1935) 14 ORE. L.
REv. 5O1; Notes (1938) 23 CORN. L. Q. 339, (937) 46 YALE L. J. lO64.
directly neutral parties, has been considered as outside the scope of the term "labor
dispute" and still subject to be enjoined. Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor
Disputes (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 341; Legis. (1937) 5o HARV. L. REv. 1295; (1938) 5 U.
OF Ci. L. Rw. 514.
1o. The Norris-La Guardia Act and the state anti-injunction acts provided that

no injunction shall be granted in "labor disputes". The secondary boycott, involving
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An injunction then is properly granted in the instant case, where both primary and secondary boycotts are involved. This case is unique, however,
since the plaintiff corporation is actually owned by a union. Because of
this unusual fact, the dissenting justice would deny the injunction. Applying the alter ego doctrine, he contends that this dispute is in reality between
two rival trade unions, the plaintiff corporation being inseparable from its
constituents. Since the parent union has decided this internal controversy
in favor of the defendants, it is not within the province of the court to take
jurisdiction," and apply an injunction to hinder the defendants in enforcing their rights under such a decision. The basic assumption of the dissenting justice that the alter ego doctrine should be applied is improperly
taken. The courts universally agree that the "corporate veil" will be
pierced only to promote justice. 2 Adoption of this doctrine in the instant
case would lead to a directly opposite result; the plaintiff being denied protection of the court from the illegal operations of the defendants in boycotting, thus, thwarting instead of invoking justice.

Master and Servant-Effect of Servant's Immunity on Tort Liability of Master-Plaintiff alleged that she was injured by negligent
operation of a car driven by her husband in the scope of his employment
by defendant, and the trial court granted defendant's motion to strike out
the complaint on the ground that the exemption of the husband employee
from liability to plaintiff precluded action against the employer. Held (four
judges dissenting), that the complaint be reinstated since the immunity of
the husband did not extend to the employer.' Hudson v. Gas Consumers'
Ass'n, 8 A. (2d) 337 (N. J. Ct. Errors and App. 1939).
2
In adopting the majority rule allowing recovery against the employer,
the New Jersey court decided for the first time a much disputed question.
ii. See 4 Am. JUR. 466, for an elaboration of the principle that "The decision of
the tribunals of an association with respect to its internal affairs will, in the absence
of mistake, fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, be accepted by the courts as conclusive".
For a complete view of intra-union disputes, see Note, Disputes Within Trade Unions
(1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1248. See Obergfell v. Green, note I supra at 591.
12. The concensus of opinion of the courts has been that only "when the conception of corporate entity is employed to defraud creditors, to evade an existing obligation, or to circumvent a statute, to achieve or perpetuate a monopoly, or to protect
knavery or crime, the courts will draw aside the web of entity". Wormser, Piercing
the Corporate Entity (1912) 12 COL. L. REv. 496, 517. The courts consistently apply
the alter ego doctrine then only in extreme cases, in which rank injustice would otherwise result. See ANDERSON, LImITATIONS OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY (1931) §§ 12, 24,
72; Note, The Modert Tendency to Disregardthe Theory of Corporate Entity (1924)
72 U. OF PA. L. REv.

158,

162.

I. An analogous situation is suit by an unemancipated minor against parent's employer or insurer, with the following cases allowing such action: Chase v. New Haven
Waste Material Corp., III Conn. 377, 15o Atl. 107 (1930); LeSage v. LeSage, 223
Wis. 550, 271 N. W. 369 (1937) ; see Note (1930) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 8o. Contra:
Myers v. Tranquility Irr. Dist., 26 Cal. App. (2d) 385, 79 P. (2d) 419 (1938), (939)
12 So. CALIF. L. REv. 218; Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 Ill. App. 164 (933).
2. Klinger v. Steffens, 17 N. J. Misc. 118, 6 A. (2d) 217 (Sup. Ct 1939); Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253, 164 N. E. 42 (1928), (1929) 29 COL. L.
REv. 222, 42 HARv. L. REv. 697; Koontz v. Messer, 320 Pa. 487, 181 Atl. 792 (I935),
(1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 791; Poulin v. Graham, 102 Vt. 307, 147 Atl. 698 (1929) ;
Note (1938) 116 A. L. R. 646; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (933) § 217, comment b. It is
interesting to note that, because of a strict interpretation of the Partnership Law, N. Y.
CONSOL. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 40, § 24, a wife has not been allowed recovery from
her husband's partners. Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N. Y. 445, 148 N. E. 23 (I935), (1936)
U. OF PA. L. REv. 429.
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Courts denying the liability of the husband's employer interpret the maxim

respondeat superior as meaning that the master's liability is derivative from
3

that of the servant. From this premise they reason syllogistically that,
since a husband's tort to the person of his wife is not actionable, 4 the employer of the husband may not be sued by the wife.' In support of this
view it is argued that, aside from increased opportunity for fraud,6 liability
of the employer would result in circuity of action 7 since recovery over from
the servant is allowed where the master has been compelled to pay damages
to a third person. s A sounder view of the basis of vicarious liability is
adopted by the courts holding the employer liable, although they seem to
combat maxim with maxim in saying that the act of the servant is the act
of the master.9 The recognition of an independent duty owing by the
master to the person injured founded on the wrongdoing, 10 not the liability,
of the servant, coincides with the theory that vicarious liability is a species
of liability without fault imposed because of expediency and social justice,
and is not the result of legalistic logic. 11 The economic factor motivating
the imposition of vicarious liability, i. e., financial responsibility and ability
to distribute the loss, 12 has as much force in the husband-servant case as in
the ordinary situation involving the master's liability. The danger of fraud
and collusion is probably no greater than in the case of a car-owner's
liability to an invitee injured by negligence of the driver. Moreover, the
likelihood of circuity of action is small since under modern statutes"L3 the
wife's property is not subject to her husband's debts, 1 4 and because of the
strong possibility that the husband is execution-proof. 5 However, a more
serious objection is that domestic tranquility will be indirectly disturbed
if the wife may recover from the employer and he in turn from the husband.1 6 It is no answer to say that the employer may not hide behind the
husband's special immunity, which is based on the policy of preserving
3. Perhaps one cause of the confusion on this point is that recovery from the master is barred where the servant is not liable because no wrongful act on his part is
shown. Davison v. Diamond Match Co., io Cal. App. (2d) 218, 51 P. (2d) 452 (1935).
4. For cases holding that married women's statutes do not change the common law
rule that spouses may not sue each other for torts to the person see HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1933 ed.) § 288, notes 4-7.
5. Maine v. Maine & Sons Co., ig Ia. 1278, 201 N. W. 20 (1924), (1925) 38
HARv. L. REv. 824; Sacknoff v. Sacknoff, 131 Me. 280, 161 Atl. 669 (1932) ; Riser v.
Riser, 240 Mich. 402, 215 N. W. 290 (927), (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 324; Emerson v. Western Seed & Irr. Co., 116 Neb. i8o, 216 N. W. 297 (1927) ; Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415, 55 S.W. (2d) 263 (1933).
6. See Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 III. App. 164, 174 (1933).
7. See Emerson v. Western Seed & Irr. Co., 116 Neb. i8o, i85, 216 N. W. 297, 299
(1927).
8. See cases cited in MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGEN Y (3d ed. 1923)

§ 333, note 66.

9. Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253, 257, 164 N. E. 42, 43 (928).

io. See McLaurin v. McLaurin Furniture Co., 166 Miss. 180, 190, 146 So. 877, 879

(1933).

II. SEAVEY, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior" in HARvARD LEGAL ESSAYS
(1934) 433, is an excellent discussion of the wherefore of vicarious liability. See also
BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY (1916 ed.) ; Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk 1 (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 584; HOLmEs,, Agency in COLLECTFz PAPERS
(1920) 49; Laski, Basis of Vicarious Liability (1916) 26 YALE L. J. I05.
12. SEAVEy, supra note ii, at 450.
13. The so-called "married women's statutes".
14. It is true that, in jurisdictions where the husband has control of his wife's property, liability of the employer might result in circuity of action. See Myers v. Tranquility Irr. Dist., 26 Cal. App. (2d) 385, 388, 79 P. (2d) 419, 420 (1938).

107,

15. See Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., III Conn. 377, 382, I5O Atl.
io8 (193o).
16. See Emerson v. Western Seed & Irr. Co., r16 Neb. 18o, 184, 216 N. W. 297, 298

(1927).
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family peace,1 7 because there is no policy to be served by extending its protection to him.' s However, though recovery from the employer may have
the same effect as suit directly against the husband, the danger to family
peace has been greatly overemphasized even as regards suits between husband and wife 19 and should not be a basis for denying the wife's recovery.

Security Transactions-Effect of Recording Mortgage on Automobile Left in Possession of Dealer-In order to secure a loan, a
dealer in second hand automobiles gave a mortgage on two cars of his
stock in trade, which cars the mortgagee knew were being offered for sale;
and the mortgage was duly recorded. The dealer subsequently sold one
of the cars, taking in return a mortgage which he assigned to plaintiff. The
first mortgagee foreclosed his mortgage and sold the car to defendant
against whom plaintiff now brings replevin. Held, that the prior mortgagee, having taken a mortgage on stock in trade left in the mortgagor's
possession, impliedly consented to the sale and thereby lost his mortgage
lien. Howell v. Board, 94 P. (2d) 830 (Okla. 1939).
The law is well settled that a mortgagee who consents to the sale by
the mortgagor of the incumbered chattel waives his lien thereon and the
purchaser takes title free of any equities in the mortgagee., Where such
consent is given it is immaterial that the purchaser knew of the existence
of the lien 2 or that the mortgage was recorded.3 Express consent is not
necessary, but it is sufficient that the mortgagee so conduct himself as to
imply consent. 4 The fact that the mortgagee takes a mortgage on a dealer's
stock in trade and allows such stock in trade to remain in the dealer's
possession exposed to sale has been held to be such an implication. It is
on this rule that the decision in the instant case is based, 6 the court holding
§ 217, comment b.
18. Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253, 256, 164 N. E. 42, 43 (1928).
ig. See HARPER, loc. cit. supra note 5. Speaking of the courts which hold that the
married women's statutes do not allow suit by wife against husband for personal injuries, Davison, J., said in Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 402, 87 P. (2d) 66o,
667 (1938) (where action by a wife against her husband was permitted) : "The result
of the majority view, therefore, is that the wife may sue her husband for the conversion of her chattel but cannot sue him to recover damages for the loss of an arm."
17. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933)

I. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Stock Yards Loan Co., 65 F. (2d) 226 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1933) ; Mitchell v. Mason, 184 Ark. ioo, 44 S. W. (2d) 672 (1931) ; EmersonBrantingham Implement Co. v. Faulkner, Iig Kan. 807, 241 Pac. 431 (1925) ; Martin
v. Duncan Automobile Co., 5o Nev. 91, 252 Pac. 322 (1927). See also 14 C. J. S.
Chattel Mortgages, § 262, and cases there cited. 2 JONES, CHATrE MORTGAGES AND
CONDITIONAL SALES (6th ed. 1933) §§ 458, 465. The mortgagee having once consented,
it is immaterial that thereafter the sale is made without his knowledge. Pratt v. Maynard, 116 Mass. 388 (1874). But if the mortgagee intended, and the purchaser understood that the sale was subject to the mortgage, then the lien would not be waived.
Universal Credit Co. v. Reilly, 171 Okla. 286, 42 P. (2d) 516 (935).
2. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Stock Yards Loan Co., 65 F. (2d) 226 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1933) ; Martin v. Duncan Automobile Co., 5o Nev. 91, 252 Pac. 322 (1927). 2
JONES, op. cit. mspra note 1, § 465.
3. National City Bank of Rome v. Adams, 3o Ga. App. 219, 117 S. E. 285 (1923);
Denno v. Standard Acceptance Corp., 277 Mass. 251, 178 N. E. 513 (1931), (1932) 8o
U. oF PA. L. REv. 755. Contra: Hardin v. State Bank of Seattle, 11g Wash. 169, 205
Pac. 382 (1922).
4. Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Missouri Livestock Commission Co., 53 F. (2d) 99I (C.
C. A. 8th, 1931) ; Hangen v. Hachemeister, 114 N. Y. 566, 21 N. E. 1046 (1889).
5. 14 C. J. S. Chattel Mortgages, § 262b, and cases there cited. For an excellent
and exhaustive analysis of the law of mortgages on stocks of merchandise in the various
states, see 2 JONES, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 77 et seq.
6. Instant case at 831.
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that there is no material distinction between a mortgaged stock of goods
consisting of small articles of general merchandise and one made up of
such large and easily identifiable articles as automobiles.7 The reason advanced in support of this rule, which represents the great weight of authority,8 is that to hold otherwise would force every person purchasing
goods from a retailer to inquire at his peril whether the merchandise was
incumbered by a chattel mortgage.9 Whatever validity this reason may
have when applied to stocks of general merchandise, it certainly has no
application to the sale of new automobiles, and it is hardly sound when
applied to the used car business. The purchase of an automobile is an event
sufficiently infrequent to justify requiring the purchaser to examine the
records to make sure that the title is clear. 10 Moreover, there is an accepted practice of making loans to automobile dealers, taking in return a
chattel mortgage, and to deny to these mortgages the protection of the
recording statutes would jeopardize a flourishing loan business. Where a
mortgage on an automobile is recorded and the mortgagee allows the mortgagor to retain possession there is no policy which demands that the mortgagee be said impliedly to have consented to a sale of the automobile and
thereby to have waived his lien. This is true although the mortgagor be a
dealer 11 even in the used car trade where the sales are closed more quickly
than in the case of new cars. In the absence of such a policy there is no
reason to suspend the normal operation of the recording statutes 12 whereby
the prior lien of a mortgagee who has duly recorded is maintained against
a subsequent purchaser.' 3

Taxation-Apportionment of Personal Property Tax as Violative
of Uniformity Clause-A statute rendered the assets of a trust estate
subject to a personal property tax in each county in which any of the
trustees were domiciled, in the proportion that the number of trustees' in

that county bore to the total number of trustees.'

The personal property

of the trust estate was located and administered in Philadelphia County by
7.Ibid.
8. "No reason is apparent why the rule as to mortgages on stocks of goods should
not be applied to . . . automobiles held for sale at, retail." Colorado Motor Finance
Co. v. Smith, 72 Colo. 150, 152, 210 Pac. 73, 74 (ig22). Coffman v. Citizens' Loan &
Investment Co., 172 Ark. 889, 290 S. W. 961 (1927) ; Denno v. Standard Acceptance
Corp., 277 Mass. 251, 178 N. E. 513 (1931), (932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 755; Boice
v. Finance & Guaranty Corp., 127 Va. 563, 102 S. E. 591 (1920). Contra: Whitehurst
v. Garrett, i96 N. C. 154, 144 S. E. 835 (1928).
9. "If the law were otherwise, no one would dare purchase at a merchant's retail
store . .
any . . . article of merchandise, without first searching the chattel
mortgage records in the office of the county clerk and recorder." Moore v. Ellison, 82
Colo. 478, 481, 261 Pac. 461, 462 (927).
To the same effect see (1932) 8o U. oF PA.
L. Ray. 755. The writer, however, falls into the same error as the court in Moore v.
Ellison, supra, and completely ignores the distinction between automobiles and general
merchandise, the distinction being that the former are not so currently in commerce
that it would be unjust to require a purchaser to check title.
io."The purchase of an automobile is not even so ordinary an occurrence by a
particular individual as to make it especially burdensome for him . . . to examine
the records to ascertain whether the automobile is mortgaged." Palmisano v. Louisiana
Motors Co., Inc., x66 La. 416, 422, 177 So. 446, 448 (1928).
ii. Hardin v. State Bank of Seattle, ii Wash. i6g, 205 Pac. 382 (1922).
12. "There must be some very substantial ground for denying to the recording the

effect of constructive notice to all subsequent . . . purchasers under the recording
statutes." General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hanahan, 146 S. C. 257, 262, 143 S. E.
82o, 822 (1928).
13. I JoxEs, op. cit. supra note i, § 236a.
i. Gen. Sessions of Penna., 1939, No. 235, § 2.
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a trustee there located. A co-trustee was domiciled in another county.
Held, the statute contravenes the uniformity clause 2 since there are no
subjects within the territorial limits of any other county but Philadelphia
County.' Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company's Appeal, Phila, Legal
Intelligencer, Oct. 31, 1939, p. I, col. 3 (Pa. C. P. 1939). Contra, Appeal,
of Fidelity-PhiladelphiaTrust Company, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Nov.
21, 1939, P. I, col. I (Pa. C. P. 1939).
When taxing, a county is only exercising a power delegated to it by the
state.4 It follows that so long as the state had authority to levy the tax in
question, the county, when authorized to collect the tax by the state, should
have a like authority. In the absence of constitutional restriction, a state has
unlimited power to tax everything within its jurisdiction,5 and the uniformity clause, which is such a limitation, was intended to prevent the imposition
of a special tax favoring one class at the expense of another 6 and not to
place territorial limits on the taxing authority of a political subdivision of
the state.7 The legislature may, without violating the constitutional provision in regard to uniformity, fix the situs for purposes of taxation of
personal property subject to the taxing power of the state, 8 giving, it
a situs other than the domicile of the owner,9 it being sufficient that the
property be taxed uniformly with other property in the same taxing locality.
In keeping with these considerations, it is submitted that the legislature, in
the instant case, was not violating the provision as to uniformity in fixing
the situs of the trust estate for purposes of taxation.10
The decision, upholding the validity of this tax, relied heavily on the
contention that a county " could not question the constitutionality of this
tax on the ground that it was violative of the uniformity clause, because the
2. PENNA. CoNsT., art. IX, § I. "All taxes shall be'uniform upon the same class
of subjects within the territory limits of the authority levying the taxes, and shall be
levied and collected under general laws."
3. The court states that the property does not have a situs in a particular county
simply because a trustee is domiciled there. Because of limited space, the subject of
situs will not be discussed here. However, it is well to note that in reaching its decision
as to situs the court relies on cases involving two states and not two counties. It is submitted that the same considerations as to situs of property for taxation cannot be applied
where two counties are involved as where two states are involved. See Note (393o) 67
A. L. R. 393. The rule, contra to the holding in the instant case, is that a trust estate
does have a situs for the purpose of taxation at the domicile of the trustee. City of
Blakely v. Hilton et al., 15o Ga. 27, 302 S. E. 340 (192o); 3 CooLEY, TE LAW OF
TAXATION ( 4 th ed. 1924) 2231. Where there are two or more trustees residing in different counties, the result attempted to be reachd by statute here is the common law
rule. PERRY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRuSTEES (7th ed. 1929) 575.
4. Daly v. Morgan, 69 Md. 460 (1888) ; Baltimore & E. S. R. R. v. Spring, 8o Md.

510, 31 AtI. 2o8 (1895).
5. Kirby v. Shaw, i9 Pa. 258 (3852) ; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. 352 (3871).

6. Note (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. R V. 219, and authorities cited therein..
7. Mendota First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 65 Ill. 44 (1872) ; Freedom Twp. of Republic County v. Douglas, 99 Kan. 176, 16o Pac. 1147 (1916).
8. Gulf Refining Co. v. Tillinghast, I52 La. 847, 94 So. 418 (1922); Vanatta v.
Runyan, 41 N. J. Law 98 (1879).
9. Mendota First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 65 Ill. 44 (872).
3o. The result reached might be condoned if the situs for purposes of taxation was
fixed arbitrarily. However, the situs was not arbitrarily fixed here, since a trustee of
the property must reside in the county in order that the property be taxable there.
ii. The County of Philadelphia was the intervening appellant in both of these
cases and raised the question of the constitutionality of the tax. The ruling of the court
could not affect the trust estate, since it would pay the same amount of taxes, no matter
how the court ruled. The only question was to what county was the tax to be paid, and
in what proportion.
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provision was for the benefit of the taxable and not of the tax collecting
agency. It is true that this provision was not intended to inure to the
benefit of the tax collecting agency, 12 but if a literal application of its terms
does benefit them, there is no reason why they should be denied its protection.' 3 So long as a constitutional provision is in force any party in interest
should be permitted to raise the question of its violation. However, though
the reasoning may be erroneous, the result reached is the only one consonant with a logical interpretation of the uniformity clause.' 4

Taxation-Surtax Upon Undistributed Adjusted Net IncomeThe Revenue Act of 1934 imposed a surtax upon the undistributed adjusted net income of a corporation. A personal holding company, in 1934,
declared a dividend out of its current earnings but at that time there
existed an operating deficit, so that payment was not entirely out of surplus. The holding company contends that they are not subject to the tax
since they had distributed dividends. Held, the holding company was liable
for the surplus profits tax on that portion of the distribution which would
make up the deficit, since such a distribution is not within the meaning
of the term "dividends" ' as used in the Act. Foley Securities Corp. v.
Commissioner, lo6 F. (2d) 731 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
The purpose of the Revenue Act of 1934 was twofold, to force corporate distribution of dividends, so that they will be taxable in the hands
of shareholders and to tax the undistributed earnings in those corporations
which failed to distribute.' Thus, upon distribution of dividends, the shareholder would be taxed, while the corporation received a dividend credit
which was not taxable. The term "dividends" was usually construed to
mean a distribution out of earned surplus accumulated since February 28,
1913,1 and that no earned surplus could be accumulated until a deficit had
12. I EASTMAN, TAXATION IN PENNSYLVANIA (1909) 19; WHITF,COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA (1907) 373.
13. A city was permitted to object to a tax, which it claimed was violative of the
constitutional provision requiring every person to contribute his proportion of public
taxes for the support of his government according to his actual worth in property, because that city was deprived of revenue thereby, without comment by the court. Mayor,
etc., of Baltimore v. Minister & Trustees of Starr Methodist Protestant Church, io6
Md. 281, 67 Ati. 261 (1907) ; Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. German-American Fire Ins.
Co. of Baltimore, 132 Md. 380, IO3 Atl. 98o (1918) (City's contention not upheld).
This provision, like the one under consideration here, was intended for the benefit of
the taxable and not of the tax collecting agency.
14. The court in the first case stated that the county where the property is kept
should receive the benefit of the tax, because the property is protected by that county.
It is submitted that this is a quesion of policy best settled by the legislature.
The second case, decided as it was on a procedural question, will allow a contest of
constitutionality by the taxpayer, and in this respect is erroneous.

I. 48 STAT. 711 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 115 (a) (1934) contains definition of dividends as: "the term 'dividends' when used in this title (chapter) . . . means any
distribution made to its shareholders . . . out of its earnings or profits accumulated
since February 28, 1913".

2. 3 PAUL AND MERTANS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934) § 32A.35.
3. Willcuts v. Milton Dairy Co., 275 U. S. 215 (1927); Crystal Ice Co., 14 B. T.
A. 682 (1928); Arthur C. Stifel, 29 B. T. A. 1145 (1934). The holding company, in
the instant case, relied on Blair v. United States, 63 Ct. Cl. 193 (1927), cert. denied,
275 U. S. 546 (1927) (where, although, distribution was made out of current earnings
while a deficit existed, it was held that it was a proper distribution of dividends). This
view, however, was rejected in J. L. Washburn, r6 B. T. A. iOi (1929) (citing Willcuts v. Milton Dairy Co., supra) and Louise G. Shorb, 22 B. T. A. 644 (1931).
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been made good.4 This rule was based on the fundamental principle that
could never
a corporation, the capital of -which had been impaired by losses
5
have accumulated earnings until its capital had been restored. A distribution, while there was a deficit, was held to be a return on capital, and hence
The result was that a distinction was
non-taxable to the shareholder.'
drawn between "net income" and "earnings and profits". There are many
deductions that a corporation must make in determining "earnings and
profits" which are not permitted in computing its "net income". Thus,7
the net income of a corporation may far exceed its earnings and profits.
In the instant case, that part of the disfribution which would have offset
the deficit is considered one of the deductions necessary in computing
"earnings and profits". Therefore, such a distribution was considered a
return on capital, and not taxable to the distributee, but taxable to the
corporation as part of its "net income". The result of the narrow confines
of the definition of dividends was to place a greater burden of taxation-on
those corporations which had the largest deficits. This was so since those
corporations would not be allowed to distribute dividends out of their
current earnings, but their current earnings would be considered as part
of their "undistributed net income" and would be taxable. Such a result
seemed hardly compatible with the purpose of the Act, and in 1936, an
Amendment was passed allowing dividends to be distributed out of current
earnings as taxable income to the shareholder, even though the corporation
had a deficit." This would seem to settle the problems involved in the
instant case. However, it is to be questioned whether this Amendment is
Constitutional. It might well be argued that such a distribution is not
within the i6th Amendment, since it represents a return on capital.9 As
yet, the question has not been before the court, but undoubtedly, if upheld,
the Amendment will better carry out the Congressional desire to force distribution of dividends.

Taxation-Transfers Inter Vivos in Contemplation of DeathDecedent in 1915 executed a trust deed reserving a life income from securities and a testamentary power of appointment. Her children were to take
4. Roy J. Kinnear, 36 B. T. A. 153 (1937).
5. Lorbon D. Sale, 35 B. T. A. 938 (i937).
6. Louise G. Shorb, 22 B. T. A. 644 (i931); Arthur C. Stifel, 29 B. T. A. 1145
(1934); 1 PAUi. AND MERTAN S, LAW OF Fa.aa.x. INCOME TAXATION (934) §8.43;
Legis. (1936) 5o HARV. L. Ray. 332, 342, n. 74, "It may be argued that such a distribution, constituting dividend under § 115 (a) may form the basis of a credit even
though held non-taxable in the hands of a shareholder, since § 27 (a) states that the
credit shall be the amount of dividends paid during the taxable year. But § 27 (h), preventing the allowance of a credit unless the dividend is taxable in the hands of a shareholder, would seem to override the general provision of § 27 (a)".
7. Miller, The 1936 Federal Corporate Surtax (1936) 12 IND. L. J. i9.
8. The Act was amended in 1936 in 49 STAT. 1648, 1687 (1936), 26 U. S. C. A.
§ 115 (a) to include in the word "dividends" distributions made from current earnings
as well as accumulated profits. In its report, the Finance Committee felt that "the
amendment simplifies the determination by providing that distribution during the year,
not exceeding in amount the current earnings, are dividends constituting taxable income to the shareholder and a dividend paid credit to the corporation". The amendment was expressly passed to allow corporations having a deficit, to pay out dividends.
Miller, The Y936 Federal CorporateSurtax (1936) 12 IND. L. J. ig.
9. It has been suggested that such a return may be constitutional in that the
shareholder still retains his stock (unlike that of a liquidating dividend) and also his
proportionate interest in the firm, with the possibility of the firm's assets increasing in
the following years.
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the remainder if the power was not exercised. In March 1932 the power
was relinquished and in May certain real estate was transferred irrevocably
into a trust. Both transfers were within two years of death. The Board
of Tax Appeals found that the decedent was in good health and not in fear
of an early death but that one of her dominant motives was to avoid death
taxes. Accordingly the property was included for tax on the ground that
both conveyances were made "in contemplation of death". On review it
was held, that the desire to avoid taxes, standing alone, did not stamp the
transfers as made in contemplation of death. Denniston, Exr. et al. v.
Commissioner, 394 C. C. H. 1939 Fed. Tax Serv. f 9737 (C. C. A. 3d,
1939).
Since the transferor's motive is the real basis for the tax,' decisions
under the provisions 2 taxing transfers inter vivos necessarily turn on the
question of fact of such transfers being made in contemplation of death. 3
The decision in the instant case seems questionable because it does not
appear that the factors associating the transfers with purposes of life outweigh those associating it with death. That decedent was not in fear of an
early death and that she desired to avoid taxes do not in themselves seem
to be substantial factors 4 indicating such a purpose. It is also difficult to
escape the fact that relinquishment of a testamentary power is testamentary
in nature, and if "the motive which induces the transfer must be of the sort
which leads to testamentary disposition", the tax might have been assessed
i. See United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 118 (1931) ; Knouff, Death Taxes on
Completed Transfers Inter Vivos (1938) 36 MIcH. L. Rxv. 1284, 1287. The provisions

taxing such transfers were obviously designed to prevent evasion of the tax. See
Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 542 (1927) ; Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15,
23 (1931) ; United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 117 (1931).
At the same time, how-

ever, these provisions have created difficult problems of interpretation. See Lowndes,
The Tax Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1938 Term (1939) 88 U. oF PA. L. REv.
I, 31.

2. Such transfers inter vivos are includible in decedent's gross estate for tax. Revenue Act of 1926, C. 27, §3o2 (c), 44 STAT. 70, 26 U. S. C. A. §411 (c) (934).
The
transfer accomplished by the relinquishment of the power of appointment is also taxable if made in contemplation of death under § 302 (d) of the Act, 26 U. S. C. A.

§411 (d) (1934).

Since the transfer of 1915 reserved to decedent a life income from the securities, it
would seem to be taxable under the Joint Resolution of Congress of March 3, 1931, 46
STAT. 1516 (1931), 26 U. S. C. A. § 411 (c) (934), which amended § 302 (c) of the
1926 Act. The Joint Resolution was clarified in § 803 (a) of the Act, 47 STAT. 279
(1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § 411 (c) (1934).
The court, however, felt that this transfer
could not be included under the Joint Resolution or the clarifying amendment, since the
deed of 1915 was made long before these were enacted, the operation of which was
prospective only as held in Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303 (1938).
3. United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102 (ig31) ; Colorado Bank v. Commissioner,
305 U. S. 23 (1938) ; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98 F. (2d) 794 (C. C. A.
2d, 1938).

4. Id. In these cases, age and physical and mental health were considered as factors, but apparently were not accorded much weight. The desire to avoid taxes may
equally be associated with purposes of life or death, so it seems that this desire should
not in itself be a controlling factor. In the Wells and Colorado Bank cases, it was also
held that the transferor's intent that the recipients of the transfer were to enjoy the
benefits after his death was not enough to establish conclusively that action to that end
was in contemplation of death. In Hillenmeyer's Estate, 2 B. T. A. 1322 (1925), activities of decedent over seventy years of age in attending directors' meetings and other
business matters overcame the presumption in effect at that time.
It seems questionable from the foregoing whether there is at present any satisfactory test for determining motive of the transferor. In Lowndes' article, see note i
supra, the author says, "The best that can be hoped for in this direction would be the
clear formulation of a standard, which would still have to be applied to a constantly
shifting factual background."
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under the authority of United States v. Wells," where the foregoing test for
determining motive was adopted. Although the tax was not assessed in the
Wells case, it was because the animating cause for the transfer was the
carrying out of a policy long followed of making liberal gifts to the donor's
children during his life. Likewise in Colorado Bank v. Commissioner,
where the purpose of the transfer was to enable the donor to speculate in
the stock market for the remainder of his life more actively than he had in
the past without fear that the property transferred would be lost, the court
felt that this factor indicated that the purpose was associaed with life and
the-carrying on of future activities; and this holding was in the face of the
fact that the transfer was evidently a substitute for a prior will. Even if
the tendency is to minimize the importance 7 of the test of the Wells case,
by hypothesis some dominant purpose associating the transfer with purposes
of life is necessary in order to escape the tax, and this is apparently lacking
in the instant case. But since the court here saw fit 8 to rely on the Wells 1
case, the possibility that a different result 10 might have been reached on the
evidence I" is further strengthened, especially since the theory on which such
transfers are taxed is that they are, in effect, substitutes for testamentary
disposition and are reached by the tax in order to prevent evasion. 2 Cer5. 283 U. S. 102 (i93i), at "7.
6. 305 U. S. 23 (1938).
7.Id. The fact that the trust agreement in the Colorado Bank case appeared to be
a substitute for a prior will did not seem to influence the court. In this respect, it
seems that the test of the Wells case was disregarded or at least not given much weight,
since the motive in the Colorado Bank case was of the sort leading to testamentary disposition. This disregard of the essential part of the test is pointed out by Black, J., in
a dissenting opinion at p. 30. If the test of the Wells case was overruled in the Colorado Bank case, a Supreme Court decision, it is difficult to understand why it was used
in the instant case. In Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98 F. (2d) 794 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1938) (the tax was assessed here), the court minimized the importance of the
"impelling cause" part of the test, see note 9 infra, but adhered to the "testamentary
disposition" element, which is the gist of the test. It also said, "if the purpose of evading the tax formed a substantial cause, then the transfers were in contemplation of
death." This, in effect, was the basis of the Board of Tax Appeal's decision in the instant case. But it is submitted that this basis for assessing the tax is inaccurate, since
the courts have repeatedly stated that such transfers are taxed because they are substitutes for testamentary disposition. See notes i and 3 supra. Although the manifest
purpose of the provision in the statute is to prevent tax evasion, the purpose to evade
is not the basis for the tax. The decision in the Bowers case may be justified on the
ground that decedent was an old man in failing health and there was no manifestation
that the transfer was associated with any purpose of life.
8. The test of the Wells case seems to have a weakness in that it lends itself to
speculation and opportunity to build up a case associating the gift with purposes of life
rather than death. At present, however, it is still the criterion in these cases.
9.See note 5 supra. The court defines "in contemplation of death": "It is contemplation of death, not necessarily contemplation of imminent death, to which the
Statute refers." Further at 118, the court states that, "the words 'in contemplation of
death' mean that the thought of death is the impelling cause of the transfer. ...."
io. The trust deed conveying real estate colored by the relinquishment less than
two months previous might be said to indicate that it was part of a general testamentary scheme. Here, too, there is the additional reason that there does not seem to be
evidence of any substantial factor associating this transfer with purposes of life.
ii.The findings of the Board of Tax Appeals are not conclusive unless supported
by substantial evidence, but what is substantial evidence can be determined as a matter
of law by a higher tribunal. See Helvering v. Tex-Penn Co., 300 U. S. 481, 490
(1937) ; Colorado Bank v. Commissioner, 305 U. S.23, 31 (1938) (dissenting opinion
by Black, J.).
12. See notes i and 3 supra. In Real Estate Land Title & Trust Co. v. McCaughn,
79 F. (2d) 602 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933), it was held that where the gift was part of a general testamentary scheme it was made in contemplation of death.
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tainly under the present law where there is a presumption in favor of the
Government,' it seems that the tax would have been assessed.
Torts-Invasion of the Right to Privacy by Radio BroadcastIn order to advertise its product, the defendant produced a series of radio
programs dramatizing current events. As a result of a broadcast of a robbery of which the plaintiff had been the victim, and wherein his name was
used without his consent, the plaintiff suffered mental anguish and became
so nervous that he lost his job. In a suit against the sponsor, it was held,
that the complaint stated a good cause of action in tort, for invasion of the
plaintiff's right to privacy. Mau v. Rio Grande, Inc., et al., 28 F. Supp.
845 (N. D. Cal. 1939).

Although many courts have long protected the right to privacy under

the guise of various well-established rules of law,' several jurisdictions have
recently granted express recognition 2 to the substantive right "to be let
alone." 3 It would seem that, as a result of the development of the radio
13. Where the transfers are made within two years of the transferor's death and
are not bona fide sales, a rebuttable statutory presumption exists under the present law.
Although the transfers were within the two-year period in the instant case, the court
felt that no presumption should exist, since they Were consummated before June 6, 1932,
when the rebuttable presumption was made effective by 47 STAT. 279 (1932), 26 U. S.
C. A. § 411 (c) (1934). This part of the decision indicates that this amendment is not
retroactive. But it would seem more logical to apply the law existing at decedent's
death, rather than that existing when the transfers were made, since only a procedural
point is involved.
Under the Act of 1926, § 302 (c) and (d), the presumption was conclusive both as
to a direct transfer and a relinquishment of a power of appointment within two years
of death. This was declared unconstitutional in Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312
(1932), as violating the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The amendment of June 6, 1932, has been interpreted by U. S. Treas. Reg. 8o, Art. 16
and 21, to hold that the presumption can be rebutted. In Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.
v. Bowers, 98 F. (2d) 794 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), the court said at p. 799, "This provision was intended to and does place on the taxpayer the burden of proving by a fair
preponderance of evidence that the transfer within two years of death is not made in
contemplation of death." But contrary statements also exist that the presumption is
not evidence and is dispelled as soon as the taxpayer comes forward wih evidence. See
Hughes, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes (1938) 16 TAX MAO. 446, 488.
x. Examples are libel and slander, breach of trust, breach of contract, and violation of property rights. For an analysis of these older cases, see Brandeis and Warren,
The Right to Privacy (89o) 4 HARv. L. REv. 193. For a criticism of their holdings
as fictions, see id. at 200, 211; Kacedan, The Right of Privacy (1932) 12 B. U. L. REv.
353, 357 et seq.
2. The leading case is Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co. et al., 122 Ga. i9o,
5o S. E. 68 (I9o5). For a compilation of the other authorities, both supporting recognition and contra, see RESTATEmENT, TORTS, EXPLANATORY NOTES (Prop. Final Draft
No. 9, 1939) § 33. The cases denying recognition of the right to privacy have been
critically evaluated by Kacedan, supra note i, at 6oo et seq.; Moreland, The Right of
Privacy Today (1931) ig Ky. L. J. 99, 116 et seq.

This right has been established also by statute. N. Y. Cors. LAWS (Cahill, 1930)
c. 7, § 50 (unauthorized use of another's name or photograph for advertising purposes
or for purposes of trade is a misdemeanor), § 51 (provision for damages or injunction) ;
VA. COED (936) § 5782 (similar to the provisions of the N. Y. law). The inadequacy of a statute in this situation has been deplored by Larremore, The Law of Privacy (1912) 12 COL. L. REv. 693, 701; Note (1937) 8 Am L. REv. 233, 238. However,
the position has been taken that since the courts are apparently reluctant to recognize
the right to privacy because of the lack of precedent, some legislative enactment is consequently essential. Legis. (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 324, 332.
3. I COOLEY, TiaE LAW or TORTS (4th ed. 1932) 442. The question has not yet
been determined in the United States Supreme Court: see Kacedan, supra note i, at
384; nor in the English House of Lords: see Winfield, Privacy (I93I) 47 L. Q. REv.
23, 34. The only mention made in Pennsylvania is in Mr. Justice Maxey's concurring
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and other devices, such recognition has become even more necessary. 4 However, affording legal protection to the right to privacy does not preclude the
publication of current events of public interest,5 even though it may entail
the unauthorized use of another's name or photograph.' To hold otherwise
would not only interfere with the freedom of the press,7 but would also
deprive the public of the benefit of modem methods of dissemination of
news." Thus, the law sanctions news items in the daily papers,9 newsreels
of current events, 0 and radio news broadcasts,"' despite any alleged interference with an individual's privacy. But the mere fact that the instant
broadcast assumed the form of a dramatization indicates that this incident
from the plaintiff's life, five months after its occurrence, was being exploited for the defendant's monetary gain. 2 It had been "dressed up" in
order to appeal to the public and in that form, constituted a method of
entertainment through the medium of the fictional background with which
the defendant colored the event.'6 This was obviously for the sole purpose
opinion in Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 456, 194 At. 631,
642 (937), 86 U. oF PA. L. REv. 217, 219.
4. Brandeis and Warren, supra note i, at 196, 2o6. See also RESTATEMxT, TORTS
(Prop. Final Draft No. 9, 1939) § 33. Contrary views have been expressed by Hadley,
The Right to Privacy (1890) 3 N. W. L. REv. i; O'Brien, The Right of Privacy
(7902) 2 COL. L. REv. 437.
5. The analogy can be drawn to the privilege of fair comment in the law of libel
and slander. It has therefore been contended that recovery can be had under this heading, rather than entail the danger of embarking upon new fields of law. Lisle, The
Right of Privacy (A Contra View) (I93I) I9 Ky. L. J. 137, 144; Note (1928) 13
CoRN. L. Q. 469. However, since truth is a complete defense in the tort actions of
libel and slander, it is apparent that they are inadequate to protect an individual's right
to privacy. Brandeis and Warren, supra note i, at 218; Note (929) 7 N. C. L. REv.
435, 443; (1928) 41 HA v. L. REv. lO7O, iO71.
6. This exception was first suggested by Brandeis and Warren, supra note 1, at
214. It has since become the law. Sweenek v. Pathe News, 16 F. Supp. 746 (E. D.
N. Y. 1936) (newsreel of corpulent women in process of reducing) ; Jones v. Herald
Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S. W. (2d) 972 (1929) (newspaper report of street holdup) ;
Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 89 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. Supp. 752 (Ist
Dep't igig) (newsreel of the plaintiff in connection with a murder mystery) ; see
Melvin v. Reid et al., 112 Cal. App. 285,

290,

297 Pac. 91, 93 (1931) ; Pavesich v. New

England Life Ins. Co. et al., 122 Ga. 19o, 2oi, 50 S. E. 68, 73 (9o5)

; Edison v. Edison

Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, r42, 67 AtI. 392, 394 (1907).
STATEmENT, TORTS (Prop. Final Draft No. 9, 1939) § 33, comment c.
7. See Note (i92o) 68 U. OF PA. L. REV. 284, 286.

See also

RE-

8. See Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 474, 178 N. Y.

Supp. 752, 755 (Ist Dep't 1gig) ; Moser v. Press Pub. Co., 59 Misc. 78, 82,

1O9

N. Y.

Supp. 963, 965 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
9. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 95 P. (2d) 491 (Cal. 1939) ; Jones v. Herald
Post Co., 23o Ky. 227, 18 S. W. (2d) 972 (1929). The former case, probably the most
recent on the subject, is especially interesting in that it involved the question of whether
an unauthorized publication of a wife's stolen photograph in connection with a newspaper account of her suicide constituted an invasion of the husband's right to privacy.
The court apparently evaded the issue by deciding that because of the public interest
in the incident, ".

. . the publication thereof cannot be held to violate a right of

privacy", not specifying whose right. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 95 P. (2d)
491, 496 (Cal. 1939).

io. Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. Supp. 752
(Ist Dep't 1919).
ii. See Note (937) 8 Am L. REv. 233, 237.
12. It is obvious that the program would have been devoid of all appeal if it had
merely presented the bare news of the holdup. See Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg.
Co., I89 App. Div. 467, 474, 178 N. Y. Supp. 752, 757 (Ist Dep't 1919).
13. In interpreting the statute in that state, the New York courts have made similar distinctions between reporting an actual event and a portrayal or reproduction
thereof. Binns v. The Vitagraph Co., 2IO N. Y. 57, 1O3 N. E. iio8 (1913) (recovery
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of advertising the defendant's product and cannot possibly be considered
as dissemination of a news item. It is only reasonable, therefore, to require
the defendant to entail the comparative inconvenience of securing the plainof his right to pritiff's consent, rather than subject the latter to invasion
14
vacy solely for the defendant's financial benefit.
allowed in a case of a motion picture dramatization of a ship collision) ; Humisfon v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., i89 App. Div. 467, 470, 178 N. Y. Supp. 752, 755 (Ist Dep't
igig) (denying recovery in the case of a newsreel of current events, where the court
distinguished between a newsreel and a photoplay) ; Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc.,
162 Misc. 776, 782, 295 N. Y. Supp. 382, 388 (Sup. Ct. i937) (recovery denied where
use of photograph was found to illustrate a story of current interest, rather than one
of fiction) ; Krieger v. Popular Publications, Inc., et aL., 167 Misc. 5, 3 N. Y. Supp.
(2d) 48o (Sup. Ct. 1938) (recovery allowed for use of a prizefighter's name in a sport
story).
14. See (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. io8i.

